Open news feed Close news feed
A A

FINAL STAGE OF THE KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT

Politics

The first President of the Republic of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan gave an interview to A1+:

A1+: Mr. President, in your statement on October 17 you promised to keep the public informed of the developments of the Karabakh conflict settlement. Can we consider the November 2 joint declaration of Russian, Armenian and Azeri Presidents Medvedev, Sarkissian and Aliev as one of those developments?

Ter-Petrosyan: First and foremost, I have not forgotten about my promise. In fact, I think it is appropriate to recall the part of my statement: “We will soon witness important developments connected to the fate of Karabakh and the Armenian statehood, which make domestic political issues less important. We are going to follow-up on the development of the events, give evaluations on how equivalent the steps taken by the Armenian authorities are to the demands of the situation, keep the society informed of the conflict settlement process and try to prevent the threats to the Armenian side or keep them at a minimum.” As far as your question is concerned, I must say that yes, the Moscow declaration should be observed as one of the most important developments.

A1+: Many people get the impression that that declaration is just a formality and lacks substance. How would you interpret that?

Ter-Petrosyan: Those who have that impression don’t know the ins-and-outs of the Karabakh conflict settlement process. For experts, on the other hand, the declaration is very eloquent because it includes some principal and concrete points. We must also take into account that that document is just the peak of the iceberg and what lies beneath is a more detailed protocol the essence of which is hard to predict.

A1+: What are the principal and concrete points that you alluded?

Ter-Petrosyan: There is a formulation in the very first point of the declaration that raises concern: “The Karabakh conflict will be settled based on the norms and principles of international law, as well as the resolutions and documents approved in the framework of those norms and principles.” What causes concern is not so much the diplomatically refined wording of the norms and principles of international law; rather, the reminder of the resolutions and documents approved in the framework. There is no doubt that this takes into account resolution 62/243 of the UN General Assembly and resolution 1614 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and demand the dislocation of Armenian forces from the Azeri lands surrounding Karabakh.

2. The second point of the declaration records that the proposal made by the Minsk Group co-presidents on November 29, 2007 will serve as a basis for the Karabakh conflict settlement. Since I have presented the essence of the proposal in detail in my October 17 statement, I don’t think it is necessary to refer to that again. I will only recall that the ideology of the Madrid proposal is the synchronization of two principles-territorial integrity and national self-determination.

3. The preface and 4th point of the declaration, which discusses the need to solve the Karabakh conflict through direct dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan, define a new format for the conflicting sides. Thus, the declaration finally does away with the resolution approved by the OSCE Budapest summit in 1994, according to which the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh was recognized as the third full and equal side of the conflict. This means that the NKR will no longer play a role in future talks that will determine the future of NKR.

4. The most important end-result of the Moscow declaration, however, is the fact that by signing under the document, the two conflicting sides-Armenia and Azerbaijan-have officially given their consent to the Madrid proposal, which is an unprecedented event in the entire process of the Karabakh conflict settlement. The fact of the matter is that the three previous official proposals made by the Minsk Group co-presidents, in other words, the “package”, “phase” and “Total State” versions, did not receive the consent of the conflicting sides and were taken out of the agenda. The “Package” and “Phase” versions were denied by Karabakh, while the “Total State” version was denied by Azerbaijan. The signing of Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliev signaled the final stage of the Karabakh conflict settlement.

A1+: Didn’t you forget the Key-West version?

Ter-Petrosyan: The Key-West version has not been the official proposal made by the Minsk Group co-presidents. In any case, that version also wasn’t approved by one of the conflicting sides, that is, Azerbaijan.

A1+: Doesn’t Russia’s initiative contradict your thought expressed in your last speech when you stated that the West will play a decisive role in the Karabakh conflict settlement?

Ter-Petrosyan: Not in the least. Although the Moscow meeting was a turning point, it was only the start of the settlement. The process is in progress in Europe and it will most probably end in December in the U.S. In other words, although Russia had the honor of starting the settlement, the monopoly of putting an end to it belongs to the West. Both Sargsyan and Aliev were not forced to participate in the Moscow meeting, but were clearly reluctant. In the end, both will prefer the intermediation of the West.

A1+: In that case, what is the role of the OSCE Minsk Group? After all, the need for the continuation of the activities of the group is underlined in the document.

Ter-Petrosyan: The more the need for the activities of the Minsk Group is underlined and the more appraisals of their activities, the more doubts we have about disagreements within the group. Besides being used as a working tool, the Minsk Group is simply a veil used by foreign powers to secure the diplomatic decency for the goals pursued by the intermediating countries.