NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION
Support A1+!The works on draft started last summer. At first it was not intended to submit any draft text generally. The main idea was the discussion of each available draft on constitutional reforms, their analysis and comparison with constitutional experience of the other countries as well as propositions on the reform of some constitutional provisions. When we started the work there was no draft submitted to the National Assembly yet, therefore on the whole we were comparing the current Constitution with all those drafts which were put into official circulation during 2001-2003. After presentation of 3 official drafts to the National Assembly in August - September 2004 we elaborated a good deal of proposals so it seemed not expedient to make separate proposals. As a result we have decided to put forward a complete draft.
The entire process of the constitutional reform in Armenia gives rise to serious preoccupations. Though the authorities have been admitted the necessity of serious constitutional reforms since 1998, up to now the presented drafts fall short of the proclaimed goals, about which there are no serious disagreements within political circles. In the context of a comprehensive systemic reform none of the drafts having been presented to the National Assembly, including the so much praised text of 2001, satisfy all the requirements which must be complied for the establishment of democracy and rule of law in Armenia.
In the stage of the elaboration of the draft we kept in touch with various political forces, political figures and before the publication of the draft, it was submitted to the fractions of the National Assembly, who expressed their wish to get acquainted with it (“Justice”, “National unanimity” and United Labor Party (ULP)). As long as there is no favorable political atmosphere for the constitutional reforms in Armenia yet, I think that any civil initiation may contribute to that process. Evidently one of the pivotal problems of the constitutional reforms is such reform of the system of government, which shall create conditions for the real separation and balance of the powers.
Pursuant to the current Constitution the President of the Republic has been given excessive, almost unlimited authorities. Though the President of the Republic has been declared in the Constitution as an official ensuring the normal functioning of the state bodies, in reality he stands over all powers – legislative, executive and judicial. The President of the Republic has a good deal of influential levers on these three powers. Though the judges and the members of the Constitutional court are irreplaceable till the attaining the age-limit, we must take also into account that according to the current Constitution the President of the Republic submits recommendation to himself on the matters of appointment and dismissal of a judge. Professor Vladimir Nazaryan has described this situation with pointed correctness saying that “The President as a chairman of the Council of Justice sign the recommendation on the appointment of a judge by one hand, then he goes to another room and at that moment sign the decree on the appointment of the judge by the other hand as a President of the Republic”.
The President’s influence over the legislative and executive powers is much more. Though according to the Constitution the President is not the head of the executive power, but in fact, he directs that power, as he forms the Government lonely, appoints the Prime Minister and upon the proposal of the latter – Ministers. At any time he may dismiss the Prime Minister. Consequently the President decides on the matter of life and death of the Government. But that is not all. Though not being a member of the Government, he chairs the sittings of the Government and ratifies all the Government decisions. He also defines the structure and the order of the functioning of the Government. His influence in the process of the Government is paramount. One may wonder why this system is called in Armenia a semi - presidential government. The Armenian system has nothing common to that form of government in democratic countries. Today such system operates only in some authoritarian or totalitarian countries of Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Central African Republic or Gabon. I don’t think that with our system of government will be possible to crate a state founded on principles of democracy and rule of law. After 1995 the political system of Armenia is becoming increasingly autocratic. No essential political forces have been able to be formed since then, because everything in political system depends on one person’s, that is President’s will. The political parties either unite closely round the President of the Republic or oppose to him, in both cases not being transformed in a serious political force. This is the main reason for a fluid party system in Armenia up to now. In contrast to us, today many East European countries, the starting conditions of which were comparable with Armenia, and which have adopted a “civilized” semi-presidential system, have a consolidated and rather stable party system. Consequently, any constitutional reform must touch upon first the problem of concentration of the power in President’s hand. Do we really want to have a Government with political responsibility to the parliament, do we really want a President of the Republic to be limited to the realization of functions stipulated in the Constitution, and do we really want a Government, having the approval of the parliamentary majority, to be able indeed to realize its functions. Unfortunately, neither the draft of 2001 nor the drafts of 2003 - 2004 have not solved sufficiently these problems mainly because of the fact, that the President of the Republic continues to preserve the right to dismiss the Prime Minister at his discretion. If the President of the Republic preserves this right, of course, we may write that the Government shall be the highest body of the executive power as it is done both in coalition and ULP’s drafts. But if the existence of that highest body always depends on the President’s will, in essence the given provision set forth in the Constitution shall be vanished and de facto this function shall transferred to the President of the Republic who has no political responsibility. In the contrast to the President of the Republic the Government is responsible to the National Assembly. Consequently if the foreign policy conducted by the Government does not correspond to the majority will of the National Assembly, it may be dismissed, but in case of the President, the sole possibility is to wait for 5 years, till the next presidential elections. The matter of dismissal of the Prime Minister has been reflected in ULP’s draft, but the solution provided there is still not satisfactory. According to the ULP’s draft the President may dismiss the Prime Minister upon the consent of the National Assembly but in case if the National Assembly does not agree with that, the latter shall dissolve the parliament.
The issue of the dismissal of the Prime Minister was not solved in drafts of 2001 and 2003 either. Though it is always underlined that our Constitution is based on French model, but in this pivotal matter the French Constitution provides that the Prime Minister may be dismissed only when the latter tenders the resignation of the Government. The Government shall operate so far as it has the confidence of the National Assembly. Taking into account the fact that the President of the Republic, as well as the National Assembly shall be elected by nation, and President also has some influence on functioning of the executive power (but only in the sphere of foreign policy, defense and security) our draft provides that the President of the Republic shall have the right to submit recommendation on the dismissal of the Prime Minister to the National Assembly. But the National Assembly shall be the ultimate authority to decide the matter in question. If it does not admit the given recommendation of the President of the Republic, the President must accept the position of the National Assembly, and the Government should continue its activity. The current Constitution anticipates for the formation of the Government that the President of the Republic at any time has the right to appoint the Prime Minister, if the post of the Prime Minister is unoccupied, and upon the recommendation of the latter – Ministers instantly. This approach is kept also in the coalition draft. Pursuant to that draft, the President has the right to nominate the Prime Minister’s candidate 3 times and if the National Assembly refuses the third time that candidacy, the President merely dissolves the Parliament. It is obvious that the coalition draft does not improve the matter of government nomination. Essentially, the same mechanisms still remain and it is no wonder that such approach was criticized by Venice Commission, as the National Assembly does not have any role in the procedure of nomination and dismissal of the Prime Minister. In this sense the draft of ULP should be welcomed because it envisages that in presence of a majority in the National Assembly, the legislator is entitled to form a Government. Our draft is based on the same principle but the mechanisms are slightly different. In our draft the right of the initiative in the process of nomination of the government is vested in the President of the Republic, which is quite typical to semi - presidential and parliamentary countries. The President shall nominate the Prime Minister’s candidate and then, after submission by the Prime Minister of the composition of the Government, the President of the Republic shall appoint the government. After that the program of the Government shall be submitted to the National Assembly and in its turn the latter shall decide the matter of confidence in the Government. If the National Assembly does not approve such Government by the absolute majority votes, then the Government shall resign and in that case the right of initiation shall turn to the National Assembly, which has the right to elect a Prime Minister. Such sequence of steps during the formation of the Government (at first - by the President, then - by the National Assembly), induces the President to reckon with real correlation of the forces in the National Assembly and nominate such a candidate for the Prime Minister, whose program has rather high chances to be adopted by the National Assembly. If a clear majority is visible in the National Assembly in favor of a Prime Minister, then the President has no sensible choice, but the nomination of that Prime Minister. The standing of the President will be harmed totally if the candidate nominated by him is refused and the National Assembly is able to form its own Government within the second step. The vesting the first step in the President makes him be a fair mediator right from the start and to build a firm foundation for the cooperation between him and the Government. If the President does know in advance somebody to enjoy the majority in the National Assembly, it will be logical for him to nominate that very candidate for the Prime Minister. The President will be fully confident, that otherwise the right shall turn to the Parliament with serious negative consequences for his reputation.
The situation will be quite different, if there is no distinct majority in the National Assembly. If the National Assembly has no possibility to form a Government at its own initiative, then it is anticipated that the President of the Republic, having a direct mandate from the people, shall assume the charge to form a Government. In this case a simple majority of the deputies is sufficient for the approval of the program of the Government formed by the President of the Republic.
If any majority is absent in the National Assembly at all, that is, it is not possible to form a “minority Government”, in this case the National Assembly shall be merely dissolved, as it is not able to carry out one of its main functions – formation of an effective Government and the assistance to that Government. This is a widely accepted solution almost in the all semi-presidential and parliamentary countries.
One of the important issues of the reform of the system of government is the right to dissolution of the National Assembly by the President of the Republic. According to the current Constitution the authority of the President is almost unlimited and it is the main reason for the prevailing position of the President towards National Assembly. Among the semi-presidential countries only the Presidents of French Republic and Portugal have the right to dissolve the National Assembly at will. And it is very characteristic, that no East European countries followed their example. We must note with satisfaction, that the right to discretionary dissolution of the National Assembly is abolished in every draft. But it is not a sufficient solution, as the dissolution of the National Assembly is a democratic mechanism itself, which makes possible to transfer the right on the adoption of the decisions during a crisis to the owner of the sovereignty that is in the people. The people shall gain the opportunity to display its attitude in regard to previous National Assembly and the Government.
The de facto abolition of the institute of dissolution, as it is envisaged in the drafts represented to the National Assembly, does not solve a very important issue: according to the logic of semi-presidential system the Government shall be formed by the state body, which has got a fresh mandate from the nation. Just suppose a situation, when presidential election takes place in one or two years after the elections of the National Assembly and the very candidate of the President wins, who oppose to the majority of the National Assembly. In that case the political situation in the country will abruptly change: an elected President, who enjoys the majority of the nation, will not be able to change the policy, as so far he has no majority in the National Assembly. The mechanism of dissolution of the National Assembly must be solved in such a manner, that the President of the Republic shall be able to dissolve the National Assembly and attempt to form a new political majority in case of having a fresh mandate. According to our draft in such cases the President has two variants: either he dissolves the National Assembly or he forms the Government in an order defined by the Constitution. In the second case, of course, it is not ruled out that the President will not be able to form a Government enjoying his confidence.
The provisions on the dissolution of the National Assembly (or the shortening the term of its powers), set forth both in 2001 and 2003 and in coalition and ULP’s drafts, bear no relation to the mechanisms for the solution of the conflicts like that. According to those drafts the term of powers of the National Assembly shall be shortened, if “the National Assembly does not adopt a decision on the draft law considered by the Government as urgent during two working months” or “if within the regular session the sittings of the National Assembly does not be convened for more than two months’ period” or “if within the regular session the National Assembly does not adopt a decision on the matters subject to its discussion for more than two months’ period”. In these three cases the National Assembly may avoid from the dissolution very easily adopting any decision or convening any sitting.
In our draft the functions of the President of the Republic are subjected to essential amendments and in this connection various powers of the President has been changed also. The President of the Republic shall continue be responsible for the issues having vital importance for the state, such as foreign policy, defense and security. But he should exercise his powers together with the Government enjoying the confidence of the majority of the National Assembly. The decisions, concerning the matters having importance for the nation, must be adopted only through commonly agreed policy. According to our draft the forum for the adoption of those decisions, is the Council of National Security, which is transformed from the consultative body into constitutional body. The main function of the Council of National Security should be the co-ordination of the activities of the state administrative bodies in appropriate domains.